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ANTITRUST AND LABOR MARKETS: A
REPLY TO RICHARD EPSTEIN
Eric A. Posner*
In his article, The Application of Antitrust Law to Labor Markets—
Then and Now, Richard Epstein argues that rather than urge courts
and regulators to apply antitrust law to labor markets, reformers who
care about labor market competition should try to constrain unions.
In this reply, I argue that Epstein’s assumptions about labor market
structure are contradicted by mountains of empirical evidence. The
anticompetitive behavior of employers causes significant harm to
social welfare—both in terms of economic output and equity.
Antitrust law is a valuable tool for addressing America’s ailing labor
markets.

* Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law
School. Thanks to Jonathan Masur for helpful comments, and Sima Biondi for excellent
research assistance.
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A REPLY TO RICHARD EPSTEIN
In his article, The Application of Antitrust Law to Labor Markets—
Then and Now,1 Richard Epstein pours cold water on the recent efforts
to strengthen antitrust enforcement in labor markets, arguing that
reform should focus on curtailing the power of unions rather than
enhancing antitrust law. As his fusillade is aimed partly at my
recently published book, How Antitrust Failed Workers, I write this
response to take issue with several of his empirical and normative
claims. I also argue that an invigorated antitrust law, focused on
labor markets, is more consistent with the classical liberal tenets that
Epstein has famously championed than the pro-big business
ideological position implicit in Epstein’s article. It also has much to
offer other ideological strains that are ascendant in American politics,
including progressivism and populist conservatism.
Epstein’s view of antitrust law reflects the skeptical take
associated with the Chicago-school tradition. 2 He believes that
antitrust law should be used sparingly, mainly to counter the worst
forms of abuse like price-fixing.3 While he sees a role for antitrust law
in blocking mergers that would result in significant market
concentration, he believes that markets are generally efficient—they
tend to correct themselves because monopoly profits attract entry
and technological change disrupts collusion—and that antitrust law
is a crude way to correct markets even when they fall short. 4 In
Epstein’s view, the real threat to competition comes not from
businesses but from workers who organize unions, and politicians
who meddle with labor markets.5 Epstein believes that unions push

1 Richard A. Epstein, The Application of Antitrust Law to Labor Markets—Then and
Now, 15 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 327 (2022).
2 See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (2d ed. 1993).
3 Epstein, supra note 1, at 332-3.
4 Id. at 336.
5 Id. at 349-51.
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wages above the competitive level, disrupt commerce, squelch
growth, and discourage innovation like charter schools.6
This view at one time enjoyed a high degree of influence but it is
looking worse for wear these days. Numerous studies suggest that
market concentration and accompanying price markups increased
substantially over the last forty years of Chicago-school dominance
of the courts and regulators.7 Not all economists blame lax antitrust
enforcement.8 But there was never much evidence for the Chicago
view, and the recent evidence that it has not improved competition,
and may have worsened it, has prompted an overdue reassessment
of antitrust law.9
But my concern here is not antitrust law in general, but its role in
countering labor monopsony, as is Epstein’s as well. In my book, How
Antitrust Failed Workers,10 I argue (1) that labor monopsony, caused
by concentration and other frictions, is a real problem for public
policy; (2) that antitrust law formally applies to many labor market
abuses; (3) that a “litigation gap” prevails, as antitrust law is used in

Id. at 334.
See e.g., Matias Covarrubias et al., From Good to Bad Concentration? US Industries
over the Past 30 Years, 34 NAT’L BUEAU OF ECON. RSCH. MACROECON. ANN. 1 (2020); Jan
De Loecker et al., The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications, 135 Q. J.
ECON. 561 (2020); German Gutiérrez & Thomas Philippon, Declining Competition and
Investment in the U.S. 1 (Nat’l Bueau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23583, 2017);
Gustavo Grullon et al., Are US Industries Becoming More Concentrated?, 23 REV. FIN. 697
(2019); Vanessa Alviarez et al., Global Giants and Local Stars: How Changes in Brand
Ownership Affect Competition (May 8, 2020) (unpublished manuscript)
[https://perma.cc/A5G9-ZJRC]; Thomas G. Wollmann, How to Get Away with Merger:
Stealth Consolidation and Its Real Effects on US Healthcare (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper 27274, 2020); Mara Faccio & Luigi Zingales, Political Determinants of
Competition in the Mobile Telecommunication Industry (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 23041, 2017). For a summary with implications for antitrust law,
see Herbert J. Hovenkamp & Fiona Scott Morton, Framing the Chicago School of Antitrust
Analysis, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1843 (2020).
8 David Autor et al., The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms, 135 Q.
J. ECON. 645 (2020). For a discussion, see Filippo Lancieri et al., The Political Economy of
the Decline of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States (working paper, 2021).
9 See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L. J. INDUS. ORG. 714
(2018).
10 ERIC POSNER, HOW ANTITRUST FAILED WORKERS (2021).
6
7
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product markets vastly more often, and with vastly more success,
than in labor markets; (4) that this litigation gap cannot be justified
by differences between labor markets and product markets; and (5)
that therefore regulators and courts should use antitrust law to
address labor monopsony, and Congress should consider reforms.
Epstein does not contest (2) or (3), so I will not repeat the
arguments here. Let me then focus on the other claims.
I. IS LABOR MONOPSONY A REAL PROBLEM?
At one time, many economists believed that labor markets were
competitive, or anyway competitive enough that government
intervention was rarely warranted.11 That view has lost favor. Study
after study has provided evidence of labor monopsony, including
studies that show that employees are not sensitive to wage changes,
that minimum wage laws do not usually result in disemployment,
that higher levels of concentration are associated with lower wages,
that wages are dispersed rather than uniform for workers of equal
productivity, and that mergers that concentrate labor markets reduce
wages.12 A recent meta-analysis, published after my book, looks at
1,320 estimates of firm-level labor elasticity in 53 studies, and finds,
after controlling for a range of factors including publication bias, that
“the literature provides strong evidence for monopsonistic

11 Orley C. Ashenfelter et al., Monopsony in the Labor Market: New Empirical Results
and New Public Policies 1 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 29522, 2021)
(describing the conventional wisdom).
12 For a discussion with citations, see POSNER, supra note 10 at 11-29. See also Kevin
Rinz, Labor Market Concentration, Earnings, and Inequality, J. HUM. RES. (Oct. 12, 2020)
(forthcoming) [https://perma.cc/G9U4-VCY2] for a concise and up-to-date
summary; Alan Manning, Monopsony in Labor Markets: A Review, 74 ILR REV. 3 (2021).
See also José Azar, Ioana Marinescu & Marshall Steinbaum, Labor Market Concentration,
J. HUM. RES. (May 12, 2020) (forthcoming) [https://perma.cc/QVR2-XVB9].
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competition and implies sizable markdowns in wages.”13 While the
authors’ estimate of firm-level labor elasticity is higher than that of
many of the studies they evaluate, their estimate reflects marketwide conditions, meaning that some markets will exhibit even lower
elasticities while others are reasonably competitive. In an even more
recent address, the Nobel prize-winning labor economist David Card
argued that the “the time has come to recognize that many – or even
most – firms have some wage‐setting power.”14
Not all labor market frictions can be addressed by antitrust law,
which is more concerned with concentration than with other frictions
like search costs and job differentiation. But here the studies of Azar
et al., Benmelech et al, and Rinz, leave little doubt that extremely high
levels of concentration are common. 15 Azar et al., for example,
estimate that 60% of labor markets are characterized by HHIs higher
than 2,500, and a quarter of labor markets have HHIs higher than an
eye-watering 7,200. 16 HHI refers to the Herfindahl–Hirschman
Index, a standard measure of market concentration that ranges from
0 to 10,000. Under the Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission Merger Guidelines, a market with HHI of 2,500 or
higher is regarded as “highly concentrated,” and mergers that take
place in such markets are presumptively illegal.17 The high levels of
HHIs for labor markets suggest that mergers will often suppress

13 Anna Sokolova & Todd Sorensen, Monopsony in Labor Markets: A Meta-Analysis,
74 ILR REV. 27, 51 (2021); Gregor Schubert, Anna Stansbury & Bledi Taska, Employer
Concentration and Outside Options 1 (Wash. Ctr. Equitable Growth, Working Paper,
2021).
14
David Card, Who Set Your Wages? 1 (Jan. 2022) (unpublished)
[https://perma.cc/JQ2M-YSWC].
15 Azar, supra note 12; Efraim Benmelech, Nittai K. Bergman, & Hyunseob Kim,
Strong Employers and Weak Employees: How Does Employer Concentration Affect Wages?,
J. HUM. RES. (Dec. 14, 2020) (forthcoming) [https://perma.cc/UY5J-E55Y; Rinz, supra
note 12.
16 POSNER, supra note 10, at 26.
17 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. & FTC, MERGER GUIDELINES §5.3 (2010).
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wages, and that is indeed the findings of three recent studies.18 A nice
real-world illustration is a recent hospital merger in Abilene, Texas,
involving a hospital with 70.1% of the market of registered nurses
and a hospital with 22.4% of the market of registered nurses. The
Texas Health and Human Services Commission granted a certificate
of public advantage to the merged hospital system even though it
would result in single-firm control of 92.6% of the market of
registered nurses, as the FTC pointed out in a public comment
opposing the merger. 19 Or, in terms of HHI, an already absurdly
concentrated market (HHI north of 5,300) was taken to a near blackhole level of concentration of more than 8,500.
Epstein does not cite academic work that provides evidence that
labor markets are competitive.20 He simply asserts without citation
that “[m]ost labor markets operate largely on competitive
principles”21 except where unions exist and laws intervene to protect
workers. He repeats the Chicago-school canard that when monopoly
rents exist, “savvy entrepreneurs” will enter the market in order to
capture a portion of them,22 ignoring decades of literature that shows

18 David Arnold, Mergers and Acquisitions, Local Labor Market Concentration, and
Worker Outcomes (Oct. 27, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) [https://perma.cc/N7FMBALB]; Benmelech et al., supra note 15; Elena Prager & Matt Schmitt, Employer
Consolidation and Wages: Evidence from Hospitals, 111 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (2021).
19 FTC, Staff Submission to Texas Health and Human Services Commission
Regarding the Certificate of Public Advantage Applications of Hendrick Health
System and Shannon Health System 37 (Sept. 11, 2020) [https://perma.cc/WX2HEUM8].
20 He could have; there are some studies that estimate relatively high elasticities.
See Sokolova & Sorensen, supra note 13. But Sokolova and Sorenson’s meta-analysis
indicates that fairly low elasticities prevail. It is important to keep in mind that from
an antitrust standpoint, the relevant issue is not the median or mean elasticity, which
offers a general picture of labor markets but masks the distribution. It is clear that in
many labor markets, elasticities are quite low, and if labor markets with high
elasticities also prevail, that in no way offsets the problem.
21 See also id. at 711, 742-43, 765-66.
22 Epstein, supra note 1, at 362.
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how incumbents can block or buy out those potential entrants.23 The
only empirical evidence he cites are turnover rates and the existence
of a “labor shortage” in the middle of a pandemic.24 But turnover
rates in isolation do not indicate the presence of labor market
competition.25 Moreover, while Epstein insists that turnover rates are
“high,” he does not provide any basis for thinking that the numbers
are high rather than low.26

23 See, e.g., Steven Salop & David Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV.
267 (1983); Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 7.
24 Epstein, supra note 1, at 359-61.
25 See Venkataraman Bhaskar et al., Oligopsony and Monopsonistic Competition in
Labor Markets, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 155, 158 (2002) (“Some economists doubt the
importance of labor market imperfections because of high levels of labor turnover,
which seems to imply an active and flexible labor market. But, it is not the level of
labor turnover that is important; it is the sensitivity to the wage.”). Epstein also
acknowledges the existence of wage dispersion, which economists agree is evidence
against competitive labor markets. Bhaskar et al., supra, at 156 (“The existence of
substantial wage dispersion among workers of very similar quality suggests that labor
market imperfections are important and inevitably give employers some oligopsony
power”).
26 In his Response, Epstein takes issue with my reliance on various studies, like
those of Arnold, Azar et al., and Rinz. Richard A. Epstein, Antitrust Overreach in Labor
Markets: A Response to Eric Posner, 15 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 407, 418-26 (2022)
[hereinafter Epstein, Response]. Epstein is right that each of these studies relies on
contestable assumptions that are necessitated by data limitations. But that is true for
all studies. The significance of the empirical literature for lawyers and policymakers is
that authors who use different data and methods produce the same result: strong
evidence of significant labor market power and/or labor market concentration in
thousands of markets (however they are approximated or proxied) across the United
States. There are now dozens of such studies (see the citations in Sokolova, supra note
13, and Schubert et al., supra note 13; Gregor Jarosch et al., Granular Search, Market
Structure, and Wages (Jan. 2021) (unpublished); José Azar et al., Estimating Labor Market
Power (Sept. 18, 2019) (unpublished), and I am unaware of a single study that
contradicts them. Epstein is right if his claim is only that the evidence of a causal
impact running from concentration to wage suppression remains contestable. The
Prager and Schmitt study offer the best evidence of causation, but it is a study only of
hospitals, and perhaps hospital markets are different from all others, though I see no
reason to think this is the case. Epstein speculates that studies define labor markets are
defined too narrowly because many workers move. But the evidence indicates that
most workers do not move to find new jobs, but are tied to locations by personal
attachments, including a spouse’s job, the children’s school, and so on. See Ioana
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As for the current labor shortage, many factors are involved, but
it is fully consistent with monopsonistic labor markets. Businesses
have faced a spike in demand since the pandemic downturn.27 In a
competitive labor market, they would raise wages to attract
additional workers so as to ramp up production. Instead, they have
kept wages low or raised them only a small amount, which is the
profit-maximizing strategy for labor monopsonists who accept
reductions in output relative to the competitive ideal in order to
minimize labor costs.28
Epstein also argues that the labor monopsony theory is
inconsistent with the economic good times that we had supposedly
been enjoying until the pandemic brought an end to the party.29 He
points to high stock market returns, but the high stock returns over a
handful of years can mean lots of things, and certainly do not refute
the labor monopsony hypothesis. Labor monopsony causes a
transfer of wealth from labor to capital, and thus should lead to higher

Marinescu & Roland Rathelot, Mismatch Unemployment and the Geography of Job Search,
10 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECON. 42 (2018). It is much more likely, in fact, that the
commuting zone is too broad a labor market area, and thus the studies understate
rather than overstate the degree of market power. (Even as I write, additional studies
are pouring forth that confirm the central empirical findings of the earlier studies
while using ever-more sophisticated methods and granular data. See, e.g., Nina
Roussille & Benjamin Scuderi, Bidding for Talent, Equilibrium Wage Dispersion on a HighWage Online Job Board 4 (Jan., 2022) (“we are able to resoundingly reject the perfect
competition model against all possible imperfect competition alternatives”).
27 Marc Labonte & Lida R. Weinstock, Labor Market Tightness and the Economic
Recovery, Part 1, CONG. RSCH. SERV. (2021).
28 This is textbook labor economics. See, e.g., Naidu et al., Antitrust Remedies for Labor
Market Power, 132 HARD. L. REV. 536 (2018) at 556. In his Response to my Reply, Epstein
elaborates on his claims about the pandemic-induced turmoil in labor markets, but I
do not understand the bearing of his discussion on my claims. I have never alleged “a
grand cartel scheme.” Epstein, Response, supra note 26, at 412-14. In my book and other
writing, I recognize that the empirical literature shows enormous variation in labor
markets: some are close to competitive, while others are extremely concentrated. The
evidence on cartels (that is, explicit forms of collusion) is mostly anecdotal, as it is for
product markets. But that evidence is accumulating, as more cases are brought.
29 Epstein, supra note 1, at 354.
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stock market returns, which mostly accrue to the wealthy at the
expense of workers in monopsonized markets. Epstein also cites
household income figures, which were rising before the pandemic
struck. 30 But taken in isolation, they also tell us nothing. Labor
monopsonists choose the wage where marginal revenue product
equals marginal cost. Rising worker productivity over time will thus
result in higher wages over time even if all employers are
monopsonists. Whether household income is rising, falling, or
steady, it is lower in a labor market characterized by monopsony or
monopsonistic competition than it would be in a competitive labor
market. In any event, the consensus view is that over several decades
labor’s share of income has dropped steadily, though not necessarily
because of a rise in labor monopsony; more likely, the decline of
union density is the culprit.31 Economic growth has also stagnated
over the last few decades, consistent again with monopsony (as well
as monopoly), which lowers output.32
II. IS THE LITIGATION GAP JUSTIFIED?
While Epstein does not address this question directly, he plainly
believes that the litigation gap does not imply antitrust

Id. at 356-58.
Henry Farber et al., Unions and Inequality over the Twentieth Century: New Evidence
from Survey Data, 136 Q. J. ECON. 1325 (2021) (showing evidence of positive correlation
between union density and income equality); see also Anna Stansbury & Larry H.
Summers, The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis: An Explanation for the Recent Evolution
of the American Economy (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch, Working Paper No. 27193, 2020). On
the decline of labor’s share, see Autor et al., supra note 8, at 646 (“there is a general
consensus that the fall is real and significant”).
32 All that said, in contrast to the evidence on product market monopoly, there is
no direct evidence that labor market concentration has increased, although there has
been a big jump in the use of covenants not to compete, and other anticompetitive
practices may also be on the rise. See, e.g., Rinz, supra note 9; David W. Berger et al.,
Labor Market Power (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25719, 2019);
Alan B. Kreuger & Eric A. Posner, A Proposal for Protecting Low-Income Workers From
Monopsony and Collusion, HAMILTON PROJECT (2018). The motivation for the laborantitrust agenda is the high level of monopsony, which has apparently existed for
quite a long time, and not necessarily any increase in labor monopsony in recent years.
30
31
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underenforcement in labor markets. Epstein surveys the legal
landscape and argues that antitrust litigation aimed at horizontal
collusion in labor markets may be justified but he appears to be
skeptical that such collusion is common; that antitrust litigation
aimed at covenants not to compete is unnecessary because common
law regulation is sufficient; and that review of mergers for labor
market effects may be justified but is usually unnecessary as productside review will normally catch mergers that produce adverse labormarket effects.33 The overall impression, then, is that the status quo
is sufficient.
The frequency with which collusion takes place in labor markets
is an open question. Conspirators do not announce their conspiracies;
conspiracies must be uncovered through painstaking investigation,
often with the help of whistleblowers. For a long time, some
economists and lawyers were skeptical that product market collusion
took place with any frequency. 34 But after investigative resources
were ramped up, numerous conspiracies—many of them complex,
and international—came to light.35 There is a good theoretical reason
to believe that labor market collusion is common: because rational
profit-maximizing CEOs know that the government criminally
enforces the antitrust laws in product markets while mostly ignoring
labor markets, and money is money whether it comes from labor
market rents or product market rents, they ought to exploit labor
markets rather than product markets on the margin. Since the Justice
Department announced that it would begin criminal investigations
of labor market collusion in 2016, it has brought four indictments, all

33
34

Epstein, supra note 1, at 385.
Bork, supra note 2. For a discussion, see Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note

7.
35 Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do:
Determinants of Cartel Duration, 54 J.L. & ECON. 455 (2011).
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just in the last year. 36 The Kreuger and Aschenfelter analysis of
franchise no-poach agreements shows that they were extremely
common, used by 58% of major franchise brands, who collectively
employed many millions of workers.37 A number of private actions
have also been brought in recent years.38 The evidence thus suggests
that labor market collusion is occurring, but we will have to wait
before we know the magnitude of the problem.
With respect to covenants not to compete, several studies
indicate that they do suppress wages, contrary to Epstein’s claims.39
How is this possible in light of common law regulation? The answer
is that common law regulation varies across states, and in some states
it is quite light. Moreover, common law regulation does not address
market-wide impacts as antitrust law does, and so will tolerate noncompete agreements that cartelize labor markets but that do not
cause significant harm to the worker in question. And most
importantly, common law sanctions are exceedingly weak—
nonenforcement, while in some states courts will merely whittle

36 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ANTITRUST DIV. & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN
RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS (2016); Valerie Bauman, Siri Bulusu & Erin Mulvaney, Labor
Cases Turn Criminal as DOJ Defines New Antitrust Approach, BLOOMBERG LAW (Jan. 3,
2022) [https://perma.cc/85UX-G5EX].
37Alan B. Krueger & Orley Ashenfelter, Theory and evidence on employer collusion in
the franchise sector, J. HUM RES. 1019 (2021).
38 Eric A. Posner, The Rise of the Labor-Antitrust Movement, COMPETITION POL’Y.
INT’L. (Nov. 29, 2021) [https://perma.cc/88BG-MWW6].
39 Natarajan Balasubramanian et al., Locked In? The Enforceability of Covenants Not to
Compete and the Careers of High-Tech Workers, J. HUM. RES. (May 12, 2020) (forthcoming)
[https://perma.cc/Y49Q-BRUP]; Michael Lipsitz & Evan Starr, Low-Wage Workers and
the Enforceability of Noncompete Agreements, 68 MGMT. SCI. 143 (2021); Matthew S.
Johnson, et al., The Labor Market Effects of Legal Restrictions on Worker Mobility
(October 12, 2021) (unpublished) [https://perma.cc/LJ67-3D2X]. In his Response,
Epstein seems to suggest that noncompetes are used only by franchises. Epstein,
Response, supra note 26, at 415-16. Most of the challenges to the franchises are based on
no-poaching agreements, not non-competes. The literature cited above refers to true
noncompetes—that is, terms in contracts between employers and employees, not
between one employer and another employer. A noncompete bars a former worker
from taking a position with any employer in the specified industry.
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down an overbroad noncompete to an acceptable size.40 Employers
are clearly not intimidated by the law. Statistics showing that a vast
number of low-skill workers are subject to non-competes, which are
almost certainly not enforceable, along with evidence that the wages
of those workers are suppressed in states with high levels of
noncompete enforcement, indicating that the non-competes operate
through an in terrorem effect.41 Only highly compensated employees
can afford lawyers to contest non-competes in court, and so everyone
else doesn’t.
Nor is it correct that blocking mergers that cause excessive
product-market concentration will necessarily, or even usually,
address concerns about labor market concentration. Product markets
and labor markets are different markets. They are rarely coextensive
in area: labor markets are almost always local; product markets are
frequently national or international. And even when they are
coextensive, merger defenses will rarely be the same for product
markets and labor markets. Product market concentration that may
be acceptable because the merged firm obtains economies of scale in
production may nonetheless be unacceptable because no efficiencies
justify labor market concentration.
Epstein is correct that labor markets are generally smaller than
product markets, and that therefore review of labor market effects
will often be more administratively burdensome than review of
product market effects. But the government already reviews mergers
for their product market effects in local markets—as it must, if it is to
estimate the impact of a merger of national chains that operate drug
stores, restaurants, and other venues that serve local markets.42 The

40 For a list of states with the so-called blue pencil rule, see Russell Beck, Employee
Noncompetes: A State-by-State Survey, FAIR COMPETITION L. (June 27, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/T74Q-XX97].
41 I discuss the literature, with citations, in POSNER, supra note 10, at 91.
42 See, e.g., Michael J. de la Merced & Chad Bray, Walgreens Calls Off Deal to Buy Rite
Aid, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2017) [https://perma.cc/C5U9-JF54].
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government also reviews many hospital mergers even though they
impact local product markets. 43 When mergers affect multiple
product markets, as they often do, the government analyzes every
impact in every product market that is substantially affected; why
should it not look at labor markets, where harms and impacts can be
greater?
III. DOES ANTITRUST LAW NEED REFORM TO ADDRESS LABOR
MONOPSONY?
Epstein says no, and argues instead that reformers should
oppose unions and licensing laws. My view is that antitrust law does
not necessarily need legislative reform. The law is capacious enough
already to address labor market abuses. Contrary to the views of
some, the consumer welfare standard in antitrust law does not block
claims by workers.44 Nor must workers who bring claims to block
mergers and other practices prove that a remedy will benefit
consumers.
But only if regulators and courts take the right steps to enforce
the law. I am more optimistic about the regulators than the courts.
Regulators have shown a willingness to rethink legal interpretations
and regulatory priorities in light of the new wisdom.45 The DOJ and
the FTC can revise the Merger Guidelines so that they incorporate
the labor market effects of mergers; they can also bring cases to

43 For a discussion, see Erwin A, Blackstone & Joseph P. Fuhr, Jr., An Antitrust
Analysis of Non-Profit Hospital Mergers, 8 REV. INDUS. ORG. 473 (1992).
44 As demonstrated by the numerous cases in which claims by workers have been
recognized. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141
(2021).
45 Both the FTC and the DOJ have held hearings on labor monopsony; see U.S DEP’T
OF JUST., Public Workshop on Promoting Competition in Labor Markets (Dec. 2, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/S6TE-3S2V]; Non-Competes in the Workplace: Examining
Antitrust and Consumer Protection Issues, Federal Trade Commission (2020) (Hearing
transcript) [https://perma.cc/RBJ6-GVBM]; Monopsony and the State of U.S.
Antitrust Law, Federal Trade Commission (2018) (Hearing transcript) at 7
[https://perma.cc/6QXW-ZXLR]. Both agencies have been involved in labor market
antitrust litigation.
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advance the law (and, indeed already have). The courts have the
unenviable task of using the pinched interpretations of antitrust law
by the Supreme Court to address a new set of practices with which
they have little experience. To set them in the right direction,
legislative reform may well be necessary. A good starting point
would be legislation that explicitly applied existing antitrust
principles to labor markets, provided standards for evaluating
market power in labor markets, and put limits on common labormarket abuses like noncompetes.46
Epstein argues that reforms should focus on labor law rather
than antitrust law; he argues that labor organization causes grievous
harm.47 My interest is antitrust law, and so I will not attempt to refute
him. But his focus on unions seems odd at the present moment. The
massive decline of union density in the United States from the 1950s
to the present, and the fact that this decline coincides with slowing
GDP growth, increasing inequality, and a decline in labor’s share of
income, 48 suggests that a further battering of labor organization
should not be at the top of the list even for libertarians if they are
concerned about the health of the economy and the strength of the
social fabric. Moreover, there is no evidence, as far as I am aware,
that the union wage premium results in wages above the competitive
rate, 49 while several studies in the recent literature on labor

46 See Ioana Marinescu & Eric Posner, Why has Antitrust Law Failed Workers?, 105
CORNELL L. REV. 1343 (2019), for a proposal.
47 Epstein, supra note 1, at 374 and 363-65.
48 Farber, supra note 25; Summers, supra note 25.
49 There is a surprisingly sparse literature on the relationship between the union
wage premium and the competitive wage rate. While most economists agree that
unions raise wages for their members, there are few high-quality studies that show
their impact on productivity, employment, and other measures of their contribution
to social value. I am aware of no study that tries to compare the union wage rate and
the hypothetical competitive rate for any particular labor market. For a recent study
that uses (arguably) exogenous variation in the magnitude of the tax subsidy for
unions under Norwegian law, see Erling Barth, Alex Bryson, & Harald Dale-Olsen,
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monopsony finds that unionized workforces are less likely to be
harmed by mergers than unorganized workers. 50 Given the
prevalence of labor monopsony, the wage premium more likely
pushes wages toward but not above the competitive rate, thus
enhancing rather than reducing the efficiency of labor markets.
Labor monopsony is a problem, one that has received little
attention from policymakers, legal academics, and even economists
until recently. The problem is a difficult one, requiring different
forms of legal intervention. Antitrust is not a panacea. But it is part
of the solution. And it is an approach—rare in modern times—that
should appeal to a broad range of ideological or political persuasions.
Start with the progressives. They are concerned about the
political and economic power of big business; inequality; and the
exploitation of labor. Labor-side antitrust should appeal to them
because it offers a tool against those big businesses that benefit from
labor market power. It should push up wages at the expense of
capital and it should therefore reduce inequality because most people
depend on their wages for their income and few outside the upper
middle-class and the wealthy invest in the stock market. While some
progressives are skeptical about markets, and thus a bit alarmed that
antitrust law helps workers by improving labor markets, 51 most
progressives seem to acknowledge that labor-side antitrust advances
their values and policy goals.
Conservatives in the Trump years have exhibited a new concern
about big business, which they accuse of imposing liberal values on
workers and consumers, and about the plight of working-class and
rural workers who have not benefited from economic growth for
years. As conservatives are reluctant to endorse an expansion of the

Union Density Effects on Productivity and Wages, 130 THE ECON J. 1898 (2020). The
authors find that increased union density results in higher wages and productivity.
But Norway’s labor market is different from the United States’, and so the results may
not carry over, id. at 1902.
50 See, e.g., Prager & Schmitt, supra note 18; Benmelech et al., supra note 15.
51 Brian Callaci, Competition Is Not the Cure, BOSTON REV. (November 23, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/9CHW-H4WD].
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social safety net and more progressive taxes, they should at least
insist that antitrust law be used to protect workers as well as
consumers. That labor-side antitrust enforcement should also
increase output and unchain market forces should also please the
remnants of the free-market wing of the Republican Party.
And that brings us to the classical liberals. Adam Smith, the
classical liberal par excellence, displayed an attitude toward labor
markets that is like night and day compared with Epstein’s:
We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of
masters [employers], though frequently of those of
workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that
masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the
subject. Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit,
but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the
wages of labour above their actual rate. To violate this
combination is everywhere a most unpopular action, and a
sort of reproach to a master among his neighbours and
equals. We seldom, indeed, hear of this combination,
because it is the usual, and one may say, the natural state of
things, which nobody ever hears of. Masters, too, sometimes
enter into particular combinations to sink the wages of
labour even below this rate. These are always conducted
with the utmost silence and secrecy, till the moment of
execution, and when the workmen yield, as they sometimes
do, without resistance, though severely felt by them, they are
never heard of by other people.52
This remarkable passage illustrates three propositions that modern
libertarians have either forgotten or rejected: that employers
“naturally” seek to combine in order to suppress wages; that this

52

ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 35 (4d ed., 1786).
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behavior is common rather than rare; and that no one ever talks about
it despite the powerful interests and norms that bind employers.
Smith embraced the free market, but recognized markets that are
monopolized or cartelized are not free but are controlled by private
actors. After Smith’s time, the antitrust laws were developed to
counter private market power in the spirit of Smith’s work. A century
later, Smith’s insights were corrupted by conservative economists
who insisted that markets self-correct—a view that has curdled into
a pro-big business “corporatocratic” view, and that with every
passing year becomes harder to sustain.53 Libertarians like Epstein
should revive Smithian principles and endorse stronger antitrust
laws to protect markets of all kinds, including labor markets. (And
even in the unlikely event that Epstein were correct that “overenforcement” of antitrust law occurs in some economic sectors, that
cannot be a concern for the application of antitrust law to labor
markets, as the history of underenforcement, bordering on nonenforcement, is more than a century old, and has only barely
diminished in the last few years of ramped-up activity.)
The idea that labor-side antitrust law could appeal to today’s
warring political factions might seem like a fantasy, but
developments over the last decade indicate that this agenda may
have legs. While Obama-era antitrust policy was relatively
restrained, it was the Obama Justice Department that sued the Silicon
Valley tech companies who agreed not to poach each other’s
programmers 54 and issued the first guidance document warning
firms against no-poaching agreements; 55 and it was the Obama
White House that first declared that labor monopsony was an
antitrust problem. 56 One might have expected the populist-

Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 7; Lancieri et al., supra note 8.
United States v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 10883994 (D.D.C. 2011).
55 U.S. Dep’t of Just. Antitrust Div. & FTC, supra note 36.
56 The White House Off. of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: The Obama Administration
Announces New Steps to Spur Competition in the Labor Market and Accelerate Wage Growth
(Oct. 25, 2016).
53
54
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conservative Trump administration to curb this agenda, but the
Antitrust Division under Trump issued the first criminal indictments
of executives for committing labor-side antitrust violations. 57 And
now the Biden administration, under the influence of progressives,
has announced that labor-side antitrust will be an enforcement
priority. 58 Meanwhile, numerous state Attorneys General have
collaborated in litigation challenging the labor market abuses of
employers and scored important victories.59 Labor-side antitrust law
is firmly based on theory and evidence, enough to appeal to
policymakers from across the political spectrum. Epstein should join
others in supporting it.

57 Alex Malyshev & Jeffrey S. Boxer, With DOJ's focus on wage fixing and no poach
agreements, non-compete and antitrust laws collide, REUTERS (Aug. 23, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/WBL2-8BB3].
58 Exec. Order No. 14036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987 (July 9, 2021).
59 See, e.g., Brian Forgas et al., Anti-Poaching Issues in Franchising, AM. BAR ASS’N, 2442 (2019) [https://perma.cc/C2LX-Q42M].

